The enforceability of contractual variations Moyes & Groves Ltd v Radiation New Zealand Ltd by Land, John.
LAND, John 
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTUAL VARIATIONS: 
MOYES & GROVES LTD v RADIATION NEW ZEALAND LTD 
Submitted for the LL.B. (Honours) Degree at the 
Victoria University of Wellington. 
1 SEPTEMBER 1984 

1. 
2 . 
3 • 
4 • 
5 • 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
MOYES & GROVES: THE FACTS AND DECISION 
THE FINDING OF A COMPROMISE 
THE INADEQUACIES OF THE PRE-EXISTING 
DUTY RULE 
THE REASONS BEHIND THE PRE-EXISTING 
DUTY RULE 
ECONOMIC DURESS: THE ATLANTIC BARON and PAO ON 
THE SCOPE OF ECONOMIC DURESS 
THE ADVANTAGES OF ECONOMIC DURESS IN DEALING 
WITH THE PROBLEM OF EXTORTION 
CONCLUSION 
1 
2 
4 
8 
10 
13 
17 
19 
21 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is a well established rule of the law of contract that the 
performance of a duty which the promisee already owes under 
an existing contract with the promisor cannot constitute 
consideration. A promise by one party to a contract to ~ary 
its terms will not then be enforceable unless some new 
obligation is undertaken in exchange for it. 
This rule, which has been subjected to a good deal of 
criticism, 1 is known as the pre-existing duty rule. The rule 
operates to strike down all contractual variations which 
favour one side only. When obtained fairly, however, such 
variations may well be deserving of enforcement. Consider 
the case of a manufacturer and supplier of goods who is 
suddenly faced with an unexpected increase in the price of 
certain important raw materials. Due to this change in 
circumstances, he makes a request for extra remuneration for 
the performance of his contractual duty. The party to whom 
the duty is owed, the purchaser, considers the request and 
comes to the conclusion that agreement is in his best 
overall interests. Such a variation should be enforced. 
To deny enforcement is to defeat the reasonable expecations 
of the parties. The agreement is a fair commercial 
arrangement that the lay person would expect to be binding. 
The pre-existing duty rule has also, however, served to 
strike down extorted agreements. A variation on the example 
above illustrates the point. The supplier threatens to 
break the contract unless a demand for increased 
remuneration is agreed to. No good reason for the demand is 
given. The purchaser has a special need for performance and 
in the circumstances no real choice but to agree. In this 
case the innocent party should not be held to such an 
agreement. The pre-existing duty rule would strike this 
agreement down. However, it would do so not because of the 
duress, but because there was no consideration for the promise 
to pay more. 
Recent developments in the law suggest that duress in the 
form of commercial pressure can now in itself be a ground 
for the setting aside of contracts entered into under such 
pressure. Extorted agreements of the kind described above 
are under this emerging doctrine of economic duress voidable 
at the optior. of the innocent party. It will be argued that 
such a result removes any justification for the continued 
existence of the pre-existing duty rule. 
The recent case of Moyes & Groves Ltd v Radiation New 
Zealand Ltd2 involved the enforceability of a sensible 
contractual variation, but one under which one party 
undertook no extra obligations above those owed under the 
original contract. A strict application of the pre-existing 
duty rule may have denied enforcement to this variation. 
Such an unjust result was avoided, but the way the case was 
resolved illustrates the distortions of the law which may 
often be necessary to achieve the right result. In this 
note it is proposed to examine the decision itself and then 
to consider more generally the status of the pre-existing 
duty rule in current law. 
2. MOYES & GROVES: THE FACTS AND DECISION 
In June 1973 Radiation New Zealand Ltd (the buyer) ordered 
from Moyes and Groves Ltd (the seller) some machine parts 
which had to be manufactured in India. The contract price 
was $400. The seller's order with the manufacturers was 
placed in October 1973. The parts arrived in June 1976 
about two years later than they would normally have been 
expected. The buyers had not been in any urgent need of the 
parts and both parties had forgotten about the contract. 
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The manufacturers had invoiced the parts to the seller at 
$2,737. The seller offered to supply the parties at this 
price, failing which the goods would have to be returned to 
India. The buyer, however, asserted its claim under the 
original contract. By agreement between the parties the 
seller then wrote to the manufacturers asking them to absorb 
some of the cost increase, but they were not prepared to do 
so. On the seller repeating its offer to supply at 
$2,737, the buyer offered to pay $611.12, a sum reflecting 
the loss of value of money since the order was made. 
Finally, on 1 December 1976 the seller wrote to the buyer 
rejecting that offer and indicating that the parts would be 
returned to India unless the buyer agreed to pay $2,737 
before 10 December. Customs had given the seller 10 days to 
pay the duty and uplift the parts. In its letter, the 
seller also referred to a recent devaluation, the cost of 
which it said it would bear. The buyer then replied by 
telex and letter: "Appears no alternative but to accept your 
price under protest". Having obtained the parts, however, 
the buyer paid only $400. 
In the lower Courts the issue primarily focused on was 
whether or not the original contract had been abandoned. 
If the original contract was still in existence, then the 
seller, in return for the buyer's promise to pay $2,737 
would only have been performing obligations that it was 
already bound to perform. If on the other hand the 
contract had been abandoned, then the delivery of the parts 
would no longer be an obligation owed the buyer and could 
therefore be consideration for the buyer's promise. In the 
Magistrate's Court, Gilliand S.M. held that the original 
contract had been abandoned and that the buyer's promise was 
therefore supported by consideration. In the Supreme 
Court, however, Casey J did not think that the inactivity 
and delay were sufficient to establish an abandonment of the 
contract. 
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The Court of Appeal did not decide the difficult question 
of whether the contract had been abandoned. Their Honours 
were satisfied that the agreement at the higher price 
amounted to a compromise of disputed claims. This 
compromise itself provided consideration for the buyer's 
promise, making it unnecessary to decide the issue as to 
abandonment. 
3. THE FINDING OF A COMPROMISE 
A compromise of disputed claims is quite distinct from the 
lay person's concept of compromise. To the lay person, a 
compromise is the settling of a disagreement by mutual 
concession. Both parties withdraw to the same extent from 
their initial demands or proposals. For a legal compromise, 
however, such an element of give and take is neither 
necessary nor sufficient. A compromise of disputed claims 
is an agreement to settle a dispute under which both parties 
give up their right to contest the matter further. This 
settlement need not involve concessions on both sides and 
indeed did not in Moyes and Groves (where the seller's 
demand prevailed). 
It is well settled that a compromise of disputed claims 
amounts to a valid contract with consideration being 
provided by each party giving up their respective claims. 
For the surrender of a claim to be consideration, it must, 
however, be made bona fide. The party making the claim must 
h ave a genuine belief that it has at least a fair chance of 
success.3 He also must not deliberaptely conceal from the 
other party facts which might affect the validity of the 
claim.4 It is sometimes said that in addition to being 
bona fide, the claim must also be "a real claim, a 
question which is not vexatious or frivolous to litigate"S. 
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However, the conflict of opinion on this issue6 does not 
"reflect an important conceptual difference. There will be 
few cases involving an honest or bona fide belief in a claim 
which is vexatious or frivolous".? 
There are strong reasons for the enforcement of true 
compromises. These include "the reduction of 
litigation •.. , the encouragement of finality in commercial 
affairs and protection of the strong probability of reliance 
on the compromise". 8 For these reasons, the Courts have 
often expressed their willingness to support compromises.9 
In Moyes and Groves the Court of Appeal held that the 
buyer's acceptance of the higher price concluded such a 
compromise of disputed claims. However, the judgments 
contain little analysis and for this reason, the finding of 
compromise is open to criticism. Firstly, the judgments do 
not demonstrate that the seller really did claim to have a 
right to treat the contract as abandoned. Secondly, the 
judgments do not establish that the buyer agreed to 
compromise. 
The first problem is whether the seller actually made a 
claim of entitlement. It does not clearly appear from the 
facts or reasoning contained in the judgments that the 
seller made such a claim. 
Cooke J did not address this issue. His Honour stated that 
"the seller had considerable grounds for contending that it 
ad a right to treat its contract with the buyer as 
abandoned ... n 10 There is no statement, however, as to 
whether the seller did in fact contend that it had a right 
to treat the contract as abandoned. No doubt given the 
delay a claim to treat the contract as abandoned would have 
been a reasonable one. This, however, is not the important 
point. The Judge~ role is not to determine what the parties 
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could have done in the circumstances and decide on that 
basis. It is instead their role to see what the parties 
actually did do and apply the law to those facts. If 
there was no claim, there is no compromise. 
Somers J asserted that the "correspondence shows that there 
was a genuine disagreement between the parties as to their 
respective rights and obligations"ll. The correspondence 
does indeed show a disagreement. The disagreement, 
however, seems merely to have been as to what price the 
parties were prepared to accept. We are told that "the 
buyer asserted its claim under the original contract"l2 but 
nothing about the seller having made a similar claim of 
entitlement. From the correspondence we can deduce that 
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the seller was not willing to perform the original contract, 
but not that it claimed to have a right not to perform. The 
finding of compromise can not be supported unless the seller, 
expressly or impliedly, made a bona fide claim of 
entitlement. The judgments, however, do not demonstrate 
that this was the case. 
The second problem with the finding of a compromise in Moyes 
and Groves is that the judgments do not clearly demonstrate 
that the buyer agreed to compromise. 
There can be no compromise where one party reserves the 
right to dispute the claim in the future. An example of 
this is provided by the facts of Sundell & Sons V Emm 
Yannou la tos. 13 In that case a contract for the sale of iron 
was entered into. Pursuant to the contract, the buyers 
established a letter of credit in favour of the sellers. 
There was then a cost increase, which the sellers claimed 
they were entitled to pass on to the buyers. The buyers, 
under threat of non-performance, agreed to increase the 
letter of credit. The buyers, however, made it quite clear 
that their agreement was made without prejudice to their 
rights under the original contract. Although the sellers 
made a bona f1de claim of entitlement the case was obviously 
not one of compromise. The buyers did not agree to give 
up their right to contend that the original contract was 
binding.14 
The position in Moyes and Groves is not as clear as in the 
Sundell case. The buyer did not expressly assert its right 
to dispute the claim. Its promise to pay the increased 
price was, however, made "under protest". In the Supreme 
Court Casey J felt that "an acceptance in this form ••. was 
clear notice that the validity of the promise to pay would 
later be contested."15 If this is so, it is a contradiction 
to say there was a compromise. A party does not give up a 
claim if he intimates that he intends to pursue it. 
It can be argued that the interpretation put on the protest 
by Casey J is not necessarily the correct one. It has been 
said that "the word 'protest' is itself equivocal. It may 
mean the serious assertion of a right, or it may mean no 
more than a statement that payment [or a promise] is 
grudgingly made".16 Possibly the buyer did not do enough to 
indicate that it did not regard the transaction as closed. 
In English contract law, the test for whether there is 
agreement is an objective one.17 If it would appear to a 
reasonable person in the position of the seller that the 
buyer intended to put an end to the dispute, then there 
would be a binding compromise. 
The acceptance 'under protest', then, can possibly be seen 
as an agreement to compromise the claim although a grudging 
one. However, the position is unclear and the issue merited 
some analysis from the court. In the writer's opinion the 
Court was too ready to find that a compromise of disputed 
claims had been concluded. 
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4. THE INADEQUACIES OF THE PRE-EXISTING DUTY RULE 
It is not hard to see why the Court of Appeal was so ready 
to find a compromise in Moyes and Groves. The agreement was 
one which was deserving of enforcement. There was no 
objectionable pressure. There had been a large and 
unexpected increase in cost. The seller restricted its 
demand to the cost increase and was willing to bear the loss 
of a recent devaluation. Its demand then was quite 
reasonable in the circumstances. Further, the buyer, while 
still wanting the parts, had no pressing need for them. 
It was therefore not under a compulsion to agree. 
If the buyer still wanted to stand on the original 
contract, it could have sued for damages. If successful the 
damages awarded would have put the buyer in the same 
position as if the original contract had been performed. 
The buyer, however, did agree to the increased price and 
did so without making it clear that it wished to receive its 
rights under the original contract. As a result the seller 
quite reasonably thought it could rely on the promise to pay 
more and delivered the parts it otherwise would not have. 
In all the circumstances, it seems fair that the buyer 
should be held to its promise to pay more. However, the 
pre-existing duty rule could conceivably (as it did in the 
Supreme Court) have rendered the promise unenforceable. 
The promise would only have been certain of enforcement had 
the seller made use of certain devices which can be used 
to avoid the pre-existing duty rule. 
Firstly, the seller could have insisted on a mutual 
rescission of the original contract. Having secured an 
agreement to discharge the original contract, a replacement 
contract at the higher price would be binding. The 
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agreement to rescind is supported by consideration as both 
parties give up their rights under the original contract. 
The replacement contract itself is binding as it generates 
its own consideration. As the rescission discharges the 
obigligations under the original contract, the delivery of 
the goods by the seller is no longer the performance of a 
duty already owed to the buyer. There is, therefore, no 
difficulty in it constituting consideration for the buyer's 
promise. 
Secondly, the seller could have insisted that the parties 
enter into a formal deed, complying with s4 of the Property 
Law Act 1952. The variation could then be binding without 
fresh consideration. 
Finally, the seller could have stipulated that it was to 
provide some nominal consideration in return for the promise 
to pay more. In such a case also, the variation would be 
binding. 
The pre-existing duty rule then can be circumvented if the 
party who owes the duty is aware of the devices available 
and the need to use them. However, there seems no reason 
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why the seller's position should be strengthened if it did 
make use of such devices. The importance of such formalities 
under the existing law means that the enforceability of 
sensible contractual variations will often depend on whether 
the party benefiting was legally advised. Such a 
determinant of enforceability is arbitrary and unjust. 
In the case of isolated gratuitous promises the use of 
formalities or presence of consideration can perform a 
cautionary function. Such promises are particularly likely 
to have been made without sufficient deliberation. The 
presence of some nominal consideration or the use of 
formalities like the deed serves to draw the promisor's 
attention to the significance of what he is doing. The use 
of legal formalities also has the effect of directing that a 
particular promise is to receive enforcement. The fact that 
a gratuitous promise is contained in a deed indi~tes that it 
is intended to be binding. So also if the promise is 
supported by nominal consideration since the parties "have 
taken the trouble to cast their transaction in the form of 
an exchange"l8. 
In the case of contract variations, however, there is not 
the same risk of a promise being made carelessly and without 
the intention that it should be binding. Legal consequences 
are already attached to the relationship between the 
parties and care is likely to be taken in any modificiation 
of this relationship.19 The fact that the promise is 
connected to an existing business deal also suggests that 
the promise will be a serious one.20 
Formalities and 'fresh' consideration serve no useful 
purpose in the case of contract variations. That their 
presence should determine enforceability in that context is 
therefore, given the arbitrary distinctions that result, 
highly unsatisfactory. There seems no reason why a sensible 
contractual modification like the one on Moyes and Groves 
should not be enforced, even though unsupported by fresh 
consideration or the use of some other technical device. 
5. THE REASONS BEHIND THE PRE-EXISTING DUTY RULE 
No test can be formulated for what constitutes consideration 
that will work in every case. As a general rule, however, 
if an act involves benefit to the promisor and/or detriment 
to the promisee, then that act if given in exchange for the 
promise will constitute consideration for it. The 
justification often given for the pre-existing duty rule is 
that because the promisee was already bound to render the 
performance and because the promisor already had the right 
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to such performance there is no "legal" detriment or 
benefit. 
However, it is wrong to say that the promiser gets no 
fit from the performance of the duty already owed him. 
gets the benefit of ensuring performance and avoiding 
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bene-
He 
liti-
gation. It lS equally wrong to say that the promisee incurs 
no detriment in performing the duty he already owes. 
Performance either in itself or because it precludes the 
undertaking of some other activity may be more onerous than 
paying damages. There is then benefit and detriment in 
fact. An assertion that there is no "legal" benefit or 
detriment can therefore only mean that there is some other 
reason for refusing to enforce the promise.21 
The true justification for the pre-existing duty rule seems 
to be the protection of the party to whom the duty is owed 
from extortion. The New Zealand case of Cook Islands 
Shipping Co. Ltd v Colson 22 illustrates the use of the rule 
for this purpose. The plaintiff was a shipping company 
engaged by the defendant to carry building materials to 
Rarotonga. The contract required the plaintiff to load at 
Portland a quantity of cement and an unspecified quantity of 
other materials. The defendant's obligation under the 
contract was to pay freight for the cargo loaded according 
to a certain set rate. The plaintiff's expectation was that 
loading would be completed in one day, but it soon became 
apparent that it would not. According to the plaintiffs, 
the delay was because the amount of cargo was much greater 
than that expected. There was no specific finding on the 
point, but it seems more likely that the failure to load 
within one day was actually caused by other factors unre-
lated to the size of the cargo, notably an industrial dispute 
which occurred at the same time. 
The plaintiff told the defendant that the ship would sail 
that night unless the extra loading time was paid for at 
$75 per hour. Again, though not found as a fact, it seems 
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probable that the plaintiff never actually intended that 
the ship leave that night. The defendant then agreed to the 
demand, but only did so because the departure of the ship 
that night would have meant the leaving behind in New 
Zealand of materials essential for the performance on time 
of a contract in Rarotonga. The plaintiff knew of the 
defendant's special need to have the materials transported 
on this ship. 
Mahon J held that the promise to pay more was unenforceable 
for want of consideration. It was given in return for the 
performance of duties already owed to the promiser under 
the original contract. The pre-existing duty rule was thus 
utilised to strike down what was obviously an extorted 
agreement. The willingness of Mahon J to approve the rule 
is clearly influenced by this factor. In support of the 
rule His Honour cited and approved of authority23 which 
indicated the true reason behind the rule. This was : 
"the requirement of legal policy that one 
contracting party should not be subject to 
an extorted demand for further payment under 
threat of non-performance, especially where 
due performance is of special importance to 
that party"24 . 
This policy was given effect to in the Cook Islands case. 
The pre-existing duty rule served there to render 
unenforceable a promise obtained by unfair pressure. 
However, the pre-existing duty rule is incapable of coping 
satisfactorily with the problem of extortion. It is an 
undiscerning rule striking down both fairly and unfairly 
obtained bargains. The fact that a contract variation is 
reasonable and obtained without unfair pressure will not 
save it if it is made without fresh consideration. 
Further, because of the limitations on the pre-existing 
duty rule, it is unable to render unenforceable many 
variations that are objectionable. The application of the 
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rule in the Cook Islands case would have been avoided had, 
for example, the plaintiff been sufficiently shrewd to offer 
some nominal consideration in return for the promise to pay 
more. 
Given these inadequacies, it is clear that the policy of not 
enforcing extorted agreements would be better achieved 
through deciding, on the facts of each particular case, 
whether unfair pressure had been applied. The development 
of the doctrine of economic duress has made this possible. 
The doctrine renders voidable those contracts which are 
entered into under unfair pressure of exactly the kind 
described by Mahon J. 
6. ECONOMIC DURESS: THE ATLANTIC BARON AND PAO ON 
The doctrine of economic duress though clearly established 
is still in a relatively early stage of development. It is 
not yet settled what exactly constitutes economic duress. 
For this reason, it is proposed to set out the facts and 
decisions in The Atlantic Baron 25 and in Pao On v Lau Yiu 
Lon~26. The cases provide a basis for a discussion of the 
doctrine's scope and its usefulness in regulating unfair 
pressure. The cases also highlight some further 
inadequacies of the pre-existing duty rule. 
A. The Atlantic Baron 
The defendants (the "builders") agreed to build an oil 
tanker for the plaintiffs (the "owners") for a fixed price 
payable in instalments. The contract also provided for the 
builders to open a letter of credit. This was to act as 
security for repayment of the instalments if the builders 
defaulted in performance. After the first instalment was 
paid, the American dollar was devalued by 10%. As a 
OW OBRARY 
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result, the amounts payable under certain sub-contracts 
relating to the vessel increased. The builders then 
demanded a 10% increase in the purchase price in respect of 
the remaining instalments. The owners were advised that 
there was no legal basis for this claim. The builders never 
put forward any legal basis for their claim and made it 
clear that they didn't intend to perform the contract unless 
the increased price was agreed to. 
In the meantime, the owners were negotiating a highly 
lucrative charter of the ship to the Shell Company. Not 
agreeing to the builders demand would result in the loss of 
a substantial profit from this charter. Eventually the 
owners agreed to the increased price "without prejudice to 
our rights". The owners also asked that the letter of 
credit be increased accordingly and this was done. The 
owners made no subsequent protests and didn't claim to 
recover the extra payments until eight months after delivery 
of the ship. 
Mocatta J held that the builders' increasing of the letter 
of credit was consideration for the owners' promise to pay 
more. This finding can, however, be criticised. The 
increasing of the letter of credit was not the price of the 
promise to pay more but a natural consequence of it. The 
owners bargained not for the increase in the letter of 
credit but for the continued performance of the contract
27. 
A less artificial finding of consideration would have been 
possible had not the pre-existing duty rule been considered 
good law. 
His Lordship, after holding that the new agreement was 
supported by consideration, then held it was voidable for 
economic duress. The finding that the owner's agreement was 
made under compulsion was based on the unreasonableness of 
expecting the owners to resist the pressure and claim 
damages for breach. This would have deprived them of the 
prospect of a substantial profit under the Shell Charter 
that was being arranged. 
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Finally Mocatta J held that though the contract was voidable 
the owners had affirmed it through their failure to protest 
and their delay in bringing any action. This conduct 
occurred after the owners were free of duress, and 
objectively it indicated an intention to keep the contract 
on foot. 
B. Pao On v Lau Yiu Long 
The plaintiffs, the shareholders of one company ( "Shing On"), 
concluded a contract for the sale of their shares to another 
company ("Fu Chip"). They were to be paid by way of shares 
in Fu Chip. The defendants were majority shareholders in 
Fu Chip. They wanted to ensure that the plaintiffs did not 
suddenly dispose of a large number of Fu Chip shares, as 
this might depress the market and so reduce the value of 
their own shareholding. A provision was therefore included 
in the contract by which the plaintiffs promised they would 
retain 60% of the Fu Chip shares allocated them for a period 
of about a year. In return the plaintiffs wanted protection 
against a drop in value of the Fu Chip shares during the 
period in which they promised to retain them. Both parties 
understood that the plaintiffs were to be guaranteed against 
this eventuality. 
As a result a subsidiary agreement was entered into between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants. This agreement provided 
for the frozen Fu Chip shares to be sold back to the 
defendants at the end of their period of retention. The 
plaintiffs then realised that this agreement was not the 
kind of guarantee that they had expected. Although the 
plaintiffs were protected against any fall i value of the 
Fu Chip shares, they could not benefit from any increase in 
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value. This would deprive them of the very advantage they 
had sought to gain by taking their price in shares under the 
main agreement. 
The plaintiffs therefore notified the defendants that they 
would not go ahead with the main agreement with Fu Chip unless 
the subsidiary agreement was replaced by a true guarantee by 
way of indemnity. The defendants feared that if the main 
agreement fell through, the public would lose confidence in 
Fu Chip shares. The effect on the share price, however, was 
only likely to be small and probably not permanent.28 In 
any event, the defendants finally decided to agree to the 
plaintiffs' demand. The shares then unexpectedly fell in 
value. The defendants, however, refused to compensate the 
plaintiffs under the guarantee contending that it was not 
binding. 
The Privy Council found consideration for the guarantee in 
three different ways.29 However, according to their 
Lordships, the "real consideration" for the guarantee was 
the "promise to perform or the performance of the 
plaintiffs' pre-existing contractual obligations to Fu 
Chip".30 The performance of these obligations could be 
consideration for the defendants' promise of indemnity 
because they were obligations owed not to the defendants but 
to a third party (Fu Chip). Had the obligations been owed 
to the defendants they could not have constituted 
consideration. 
That such a distinction can be drawn further shows the 
inadequacies of the current law. Fu Chip can only 
technically be called a different entity. The main 
agreement was negotiated for by the defendants. It was for 
the benefit of the defendants that the provision requiring 
the plaintiffs to retain the shares was inserted. The 
defendants as the shareholders of Fu Chip clearly had the 
power to get Fu Chip to enforce the main agreement.31 It 
seems absurd that the enforceability of the promise of 
indemnity could depend on whether as a matter of form the 
main agreement was entered into by Fu Chip or by Fu Chip's 
shareholders. 
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The Privy Council, after holding that the guarantee was 
supported by consideration further held that it was not 
voidable for economic duress. There was commercial pressure 
but not coercion. The defendants had considered the matter 
thoroughly and chosen to avoid litigation.32 The Privy 
Council referred to some factors which can be relevant in 
determining whether there is coercion. These were 
"whether the person alleged to have been coerced 
did or did not protest; whether, at the time he was 
allegedly coerced into making the contract, he did 
or did not have an alternative course open to him such 
as an adequate legal remedy; whether he was 
independently advised; and whether, after entering the 
contract, he took steps to avoid it" 33, 
7. THE SCOPE OF ECONOMIC DURESS 
The two cases just outlined provide assistance for a 
discussion of the 'test' for economic duress. For economic 
duress to exist there must be i) a coercion (or compulsion) 
of the victim's will which ii) has been induced by pressure 
which the law regards as illegitimate.34 
A. Coercion or Compulsion of the Will 
In Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v International 
Transport, Workers Federation 35 Lord Scarman classified 
compulsion as "the lack of any practicable choice but to 
submit"36 Factors referrred to in Pao On, such as whether 
the 'victim' protested or had independent advice, were said 
not to go "to the essence of duress".37 The importance of 
the viability of the alternatives open to the submitting 
party can be seen in the Pao On and Atlantic Baron 
decisions. 
In Pao On the defendants did have a commercially viable 
alternative open to them. Litigation might have decreased 
the value of their shareholding in Fu Chip, but no great 
loss could have been expected. In the Atlantic Baron the 
owners had they resisted the pressure would have been 
deprived of the prospect of earning a substantial profit 
under the Shell Charter. Resisting the pressure then might 
not be considered a reasonable alternative.38 
B. Illegitimate Pressure 
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The second element to the test for economic duress is that 
the pressure exerted be "illegitimate". It seems to have 
been assumed in the Universe Tankship case that illegitimate 
in this context simply means unlawful.39 Such a determining 
factor is unnecessarily rigid if the doctrine is to 
adequately perform the task of regulating unfair pressure. 
If an extortionate demand is made knowing that the victim is 
in no position to resist, then clearly the pressure is 
unfair. If, however, the demand is not made in bad faith 
and is reasonable in all the circumstances, then it is much 
more difficult to term the pressure illegitimate. 
There is considerable academic support40 for the view that 
threats not to perform a contract even if coercive should 
not always constitute economic duress. This is in fact the 
position in America41. The Pao On case is a good 
illustration of a threat to break a contract which should 
not be considered illegitimate pressure. Both parties had 
understood that the defendants would be guaranteed against 
a fall in value of the shares they had promised to retain. 
However, the expectation was merely that the defendants 
would be protected in this way and not that they would also 
be deprived of the benefit of any rise in the price of 
shares. This, however, was the effect of the subsidiary
 
agreement. The plaintiffs then obviously had a just cl
aim 
for the cancellation of the subsidiary agreement and its
 
replacement with a guarantee by way of indemnity. It se
ems 
inappropriate that the pressure exerted to effect this 
change should be termed illegitimate. 
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Another situation where a demand for extra remuneration 
may 
be reasonable is where unexpected difficulties arise in 
the 
performance of a contract. If the demand is not excessi
ve 
and there is no element of bad faith, it is difficult to
 
call the pressure illegitimate. The finding of duress i
n 
the Atlantic Baron, however, is difficult to reconcile w
ith 
such an analysis. There could be no question of the 
builders' improperly taking advantage of the owners' spe
cial 
need for performance. The builders had no knowledge of 
the 
lucrative Shell Charter. The owners further disclaimed 
any 
allegation that the builden' proposals were made in bad
 
faith. Instead, there was a legitimate reason for the 
demand as a devaluation of the American dollar had incre
ased 
the costs in building the oil-tanker. 
8. THE ADVANTAGES OF ECONOMIC DURESS IN DEALING WITH THE 
PROBLEM OF EXTORTION 
Whatever the exact test for economic duress, it is clear
 
that duress is a far more flexible instrument for dealing
 
with the problem of extortion than the pre-existing duty
 
rule. 
The policy implemented in the Cook Islands case could no
w 
be achieved under the doctrine of economic duress. The 
case 
was clearly one of coercion. The defendant only submitt
ed 
to the demand because of his belief that the ship would 
otherwise have sailed the same night. This would have l
eft 
in New Zealand materials essential for the performance o
n 
time of a contract in Rarotonga. Nor could the pressure
 be 
termed legitimate. The plaintiff did not have a just cla
im 
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for the extra payment, as it seems that the delay i
n loading 
was not actually caused by the defendant. Further
, it 
appears that the plaintiff never really intended th
at the 
ship should leave that night and was merely taking 
advantage 
of the defendant's special need for performance. T
he 
doctrine of economic duress would strike down such 
an 
extorted agreement, but unlke the pre-existing duty
 rule, it 
would do so whether or not there was 'fresh' consid
eration. 
Another advantage of the doctrine in dealing with t
he 
problem of extortion is that it also enables the re
covery of 
payments that are made under duress. The fact that
 an 
agreement is not supported by consideration is not 
in itself 
a ground for the recovery of payments that are made
 in 
performance of it.42 
Most importantly, the doctrine of economic duress, 
unlike 
the pre-existing duty rule, does not threaten the 
enforceability of fair bargains. Moyes & Groves unlik
e the 
Cook Islands case was not a case of coercion. Suin
g for 
damages was a viable alternative to submitting to t
he 
demand. There was no urgent need for the parts and
 damages 
would have been an adequate remedy. The absence of
 coercion 
by itself precludes a finding of duress. It would
, 
however, also be possible to argue that the pressur
e exerted 
was not illegtimate, as in the circumstances the se
ller's 
demand was a reasonable one. 
For such an agreement to be upheld under the curren
t law, 
however, a Court may be forced to strain legal prin
ciple, 
employing an exception to the rule which is not rea
lly made 
out on the facts. That Moyes & Groves may itself h
ave been 
such a case has already been suggested in this note
. 
Distortion of legal principle is, of course, not de
sirable. 
More alarming, however, is the possibility that a C
ourt may 
fail to look beyond the technical rules in existenc
e and as 
a result strike down an agreement deserving of 
enforcement. 4 3 This is the most serious danger of 
attempting to regulate unfair pressure under the gu
ise of 
consideration. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
It is not surprising that the pre-existing duty rule has 
been "subjected to sustained and blistering attack from the 
academics" 44 • A rule that strikes down fair commercial 
arrangements is indeed deserving of such scorn. It is 
conceded that gratuitous contractual variations have high 
possibilities of having been obtained unfairly. However, 
the doctrine of economic duress is sufficiently flexible to 
deal with this problem. The concern that a contracting 
party not be subject to extortionate demands can then no 
longer be a justification for the pre-existing duty rule. 
The rule, however, remains the law and while it does so it 
continues to threaten contractual variations which should be 
upheld. 
The pre-existing duty rule is probably too settled for the 
Courts to feel able to re-examine it.
45 If so, then it is 
the task and duty of the legislature to remove "that 
adjunct of the doctrine of consideration which has done most 
to give it a bad reputation."46 
* * * * * 
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